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Introduction
Public goods often have a step-level character, that is, the public good is provided only if some minimum threshold of contributions (or provision point) is met. Examples include the building of a bridge or a dike. More generally, team work where the team has to meet a specific goal has step-level public-good character. Also, charities may have properties of step-level public goods if the underlying production of the public good is subject to non-convexities (see Andreoni, 1998 ).
Our paper makes two contributions to the literature on public goods with step levels. First, we analyze whether sequential contributions as opposed to simultaneous decisions improve public good provision. Second, we analyze if an additional threshold, which is not feasible in standard Nash equilibrium and where the public good is provided at a higher level, improves public good provision.
The issue of sequential vs. simultaneous contributions is the subject of a growing literature.
Following the theoretical works by Andreoni (1998 Andreoni ( , 2006 and Hermalin (1998) , researchers have analyzed leading by example in experiments. If a first mover gives an example that is mimicked by the followers, sequential contributions to the public good may be superior to simultaneous decisions. This will particularly be the case when a first mover is better informed about the return to contributions allocated to the common endeavor (Hermalin, 1998) or about the quality of a charity Andreoni (2006) . 1 We study sequential vs. simultaneous decisions in a step-level game with two players and with complete information. For such a setting, one would at first expect a sequential-move game to seem superior to a simultaneous-move setting. A threshold public-good game is foremost a coordination game. With simultaneous moves there are multiple equilibria; coordination failures may occur and, moreover, the public good is not provided in all equilibria. With sequential moves, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the public good is provided. Hence, coordination and therefore public good provision should be more frequent with sequential moves. There is, however, an aspect of sequential decision making that may reduce its alleged superiority. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium with selfish players, the first mover contributes such that a best responding follower merely breaks even by meeting the threshold with her contribution. In other words, the first mover actually gives a bad example by contributing less than the followers.
In an experiment, this may reduce the efficiency of the sequential-move setting: players who try to exploit this first-mover advantage risk being punished by second movers who do not best respond but contribute zero to the public good.
2 If such behavior occurs frequently, the higher efficacy 1 The experimental literature on these issues (which we review in detail below) includes Erev and Rapoport hypothesize that the efficiency enhancing effect dominates so that sequential moves improve public good provision. Now consider our second extension, the introduction of a second threshold. The general logic of multiple threshold public goods is that no return is obtained unless contributions meet the first level; and after this level, no additional return is earned until the second provision point is met. Multiple step levels have rarely been analyzed before (Chewning et al., 2001 and Hashim et al., 2011, which we discuss below), but they seem realistic in many circumstances. For example, the successful development of a new product in team work will typically require a minimum level of efforts of the team members. Adding a further feature or quality level of the product may be subject to a effort threshold just as developing the main product and, accordingly, the management may set two threshold levels. Further examples include a public radio or TV station which may transmit more than one program, corresponding to multiple thresholds. Public bridges or highways may be built with one, two or more lanes. Finally, any kind of public good may be provided at various quality levels and the production of these quality levels may be subject to non-convexities, suggesting multiple thresholds.
The interaction of the two thresholds and the order of moves can be hypothesized as follows. In our experiments, first movers in the sequential-move game may aim for the second threshold since this yields higher payoffs-provided the threshold is met. Since such first-mover contributions must be higher than those required to meet the first threshold, second movers do not feel exploited and therefore do not punish first movers by making zero contributions. However, the second threshold is not a Nash equilibrium with selfish players. Given one player aims at the second threshold by contributing a high amount, the best response of a second player is to contribute low such that the first level only is met. Thus, with standard preferences the second level is not an equilibrium (with either simultaneous and sequential moves). However, when players have Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preferences, the second threshold is a Nash equilibrium-and meeting the second threshold is of course efficient. In any event, even if some second movers exploit those first movers who aim for the second level, the public good is still provided at least at the first level and so no efficiency loss occurs. In other words, behaviorally, the existence of a second threshold might make it more likely that the first threshold will be met. We thus hypothesize that the second step level improves public good provision.
Our main findings regarding the two treatment variables are as follows. Sequential contribution decisions significantly improve public good provision, even though second movers regularly punish first movers who contribute too little. This is in contrast to Gächter et al. (2010b) who find the punishment and coordination in dyads.
2 opposite result, however, in an entirely different setting (see below). Coordination rates and payoffs are higher whereas contributions are not higher with sequential moves. The existence of a second threshold causes significantly higher contributions but this does not result in higher public good provision or higher payoffs.
Our paper also makes quantitative predictions for our experiment employing a fully calibrated Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. Whereas Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequality aversion has been used frequently in the literature, the predictions are almost always of a qualitative nature ("if players are sufficiently inequality averse, abc is an equilibrium"). We will calibrate Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model on a (joint) distribution of the inequality parameters, and we will make exact quantitative predictions ("w percent of the first movers will contribute x"; or "given a firstmover contribution of y, the public good will be provided in z percent of the cases").
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We find that the calibrated Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model makes remarkably accurate quantitative predictions, but it also fails in two cases. The calibrated Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model predicts second-mover behavior (given first-mover behavior) in the sequential variant extremely well. Specifically, it accurately predicts the frequency of second-mover decisions (contribute such that the step level is met vs. punish first movers by contributing zero). The prediction regarding the first movers fails. First movers should anticipate or learn that second movers punish low contributions and thus always make the payoff-equalizing contribution. However, only slightly more than one-third of them do so. First movers behave "too greedily", as has been observed in previous experiments (for example, Huck et al., 2001 ). The calibrated Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model also predicts well in the case with simultaneous-move contributions where some players contribute whereas others do not. Finally, the model rather precisely predicts the share of first movers who trust second movers by making a high contribution in the sequential two-threshold case. Here, the prediction regarding the second movers fails, as they exploit first movers significantly more frequently than predicted.
Literature Review
There are two major strands of the literature pertinent to our paper. The first literature is about simultaneous vs. sequential order of moves in public-good games. The second literature concerns public-good experiments with step-level character in general and, specifically, the small literature on experiments with more than one threshold.
As mentioned in the introduction, several researchers have analyzed leading by example theoretically. Andreoni (1998) examines the efficiency of leadership giving. The paper provides an explanation of how seed money, from a group of "leadership givers," generates additional donations. In Hermalin (1998), a first mover may be better informed about the return to contributions allocated to the common endeavor. Therefore, she may plausibly give an example to followers who rationally mimic the first mover's behavior.
An increasing experimental literature has been triggered by these theory contributions. Follow- find that sequential contributions are indeed lower than simultaneous-move contributions, although the difference in aggregate contributions across the two move structures is not as large as predicted, in part because second movers punish first movers who free ride in the sequential variant. While this is in contrast to our results, note that one of the major differences to our approach is that the authors test the Varian (1994) model, whereas we study a step-level setup. Even though we observe similar punishing behavior, the sequential-move variant is more efficient in our data. Erev and Rapoport (1990) were the first to study simultaneous vs. sequential moves in a steplevel public-good game with discrete choices. In their experiments, at least three of five players must contribute their endowments for the public good to be provided. Actions are minimal contribution sets, MCS, such that players either zero contribute or invest their whole endowment. They find that, with sequential-move choices, information about previous non-cooperative choices only is more effective in public good provision than information about previous cooperative choices. The main differences to our experiment are the discrete action space and the number of players (two in our case). Continuous contributions turn out to significantly increase contributions and public good provision.
A money-back guarantee further encourages provision. Cadsby and Maynes (1998b) also study the impact of binary vs. continuous contributions but here the focus is on gender: female groups coordinate more closely on an equilibrium (whether it is a free-riding or a threshold equilibrium) than male groups. Cadsby and Maynes (1998a) find that, with continuous contributions, business and economics students make contributions converging to the free-riding equilibrium; by contrast, the contribution of nurses cycled around the efficient threshold equilibrium.
The literature on public-good games with multiple step levels is much smaller. 6 Chewning et al.
(2001) have a five-player experiment with one, two, three or five step levels. Their experiment involves a simultaneous move order. Compared to the baseline with one step level, treatments with multiple levels sometimes keep the social optimum constant and lower the Nash equilibrium contributions, sometimes-as in our case-they increase the group optima contributions but leave the Nash equilibria unchanged. We will discuss their design and results in detail below. Recently, 
Experimental Design and Procedures
In our experiments, there are two players, player 1 and player 2, who each have a money endowment e = 10. They can make a voluntary contribution, c i , to the public good, where 0 ≤ c i ≤ e.
In two of our four treatments, there is one threshold for the provision of the public good. If the sum of contributions is at least 12, this yields an additional payoff of 10 to both players. Any contributions between 1 and 11 and beyond 12 are wasted. More formally, if x i denotes player i's monetary payoff, then
The other two treatments involve an additional second threshold of 18. If c 1 + c 2 ≥ 18, both players receive 5 on top of the 10 euros the receive for hitting the first threshold. That is, in these treatments, we have
Since 2e > 18, both thresholds of the public good are feasible, but, due to e < 12, no player can meet the threshold on her own. Further, because 2 · 10 > 12 and 2 · 15 > 18, the provision of the public good at both provision points maximizes joint payoffs. Note that the return on contributing one euro at each of the two levels is the same.
Order of moves simultaneous sequential one Sim 1 Seq 1
Step levels two Sim 2 Seq 2 Subjects play this game over 10 periods. The payoffs of the above game were denoted in euros in the experiments (so that the exchange rate was one to one). In each period, subjects were endowed with e = 10 euros. The final payoff at the end of the experiment was determined by the earnings of one randomly chosen period. (See also the instructions in the Appendix.)
We have three entirely independent matching groups per treatment. Each experimental session contained only one matching group. The size of the sessions or matching groups varied between 10 and 18 subjects. (We control for session size in our data analysis below). In each session and each period, subjects were randomly matched into groups of two players. In the Seq treatments, also the roles of first and second movers were also random.
The subject pool consists of students from the University of Frankfurt from various fields. In total, we had 191 participants. For the step-level public good experiments, we had 160 participants who earned on average 11.3 euros. Further, we employed 31 subjects to replicate the results of a previous study we use for calibration (see the next section). They earned on average 12.3 euros.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Sessions lasted about 60 minutes.
Predictions Assumptions
We now derive the one-shot Nash equilibrium predictions for this public-good game. In addition 
Here, x i and x j denote the monetary payoffs to players i and j, and α i and β i denote i's aversion towards disadvantageous inequality (envy) and advantageous inequality (greed), respectively.
Standard preferences occur for α = β = 0. Following F&S, we assume 0 ≤ β i < 1.
Using the specific functional forms of the step-level public good game for x i above, we can write the F&S utilities as a function of contributions directly, so that we obtain U i (c i , c j ). For the treatments with one step level, we obtain
whereas, for the two-step-levels treatments, we get
c i , c j = 1, 2; i = j. The χ k are indicator functions indicating whether a step level has been reached.
We have χ 1 = 1 iff c 1 + c 2 ≥ 12 and χ 2 = 1 iff c 1 + c 2 ≥ 18.
Using this model, we will make quantitative predictions. We fully calibrate the F&S model using the joint distribution of the α and β parameters observed in Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011). For each subject, they derive an α i from rejection behavior in the ultimatum game and a β i from a modified dictator game. 7 The distribution is reproduced in Table 2 . On average, α = 1.18
and β = 0.47.
There are several reasons to follow Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) here. First, while
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive distributions for the α and β parameters based on data from previous ultimatum-game experiments 8 , here, we need the joint distribution of the parameters.
We are not aware of any joint distribution of inequality-aversion parameters for the Fehr and Since our subject pool differs from the one used in Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011) and the aforementioned experiments, we elicited a joint α-β distribution using 31 participants from the current subject pool (not necessarily the same subjects). We find no significant differences Assumption 2. Players' inequality parameters are drawn from the joint α-β distribution in Table   2 . This distribution is common knowledge. Players know their own type but not the type of the other player.
Sequential moves, one threshold
We start with the sequential-move variant with one threshold (Seq 1). In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this treatment, a second mover (S) with standard preferences will best respond to the first mover's (F ) contribution, c F , by choosing zero if c F < 2 and by contributing 12 − c F if c F ≥ 2. Anticipating this, the first mover will choose her payoff-maximizing contribution, which is c F = 2.
Next, consider players whose preferences and beliefs are consistent with Assumptions 1 and 2.
Even if c F ≥ 2, second movers with F&S preferences might choose c S = 0 if the payoff inequality implied by c F becomes too big. For c F ∈ [2, 6] and facing the decision between contributing 12 − c F and zero, the second mover either obtains
where we drop the S subscripts of the inequality parameters for simplicity. Thec F in (3) is the minimum acceptable first-mover contribution for a given set of individual inequality parameters.
Any contribution at least as high asc F will be met by c S = 12 − c F and will result in the public good being provided. Any contribution lower than this threshold will face c S = 0 as the second mover's best reply. Intuitively,c F is increasing in α and decreasing in β.
First-mover contribution Table 3 : Predicted second-mover responses conditional on first-mover choices and the resulting expected first-mover monetary payoff in the Seq treatments Based on our Assumptions 1 and 2, we now predict the frequencies of public good provision as a function of c F . For each player in that dataset (see Table 2 ), we determine thec F as in (3). For subject #1 with α = β = 0, for example, we obtainc F = 2 as the minimum acceptable first-mover contribution, whereas subject #58 with α = 4.5 and β = 0.525 hasc F = 5.32 as the minimum acceptable first-mover contribution and will thus only accept c F = 6. Doing this for all subjects in α-β dataset allows us to predict how many players in our experiment will provide the public good as a function of c F . Table 3 shows the results of this calibration. In contrast to the game of players with standard preferences, the likelihood of public good provision is strictly below 100 percent as long as c F < 6.
Table 3 also reveals that the expected monetary utility of a risk neutral first mover monotonically 10 increases in c F and is maximized for c F = 6 (the expected payoff from choosing c F = 0 is 10).
As c F < 6 results in a lower likelihood of public good provision, lower payoffs, and greater payoff inequality, both selfish and inequality averse first movers will choose c F = 6 in the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. Thus we have Proposition 1. For treatment Seq 1, the standard model predicts c S = 0 if c F < 2, c S = 12 − c F if c F ≥ 2 and c F = 2 for the first movers. The calibrated F&S model predicts the frequencies of second-mover responses as in Table 3 , and c F = 6 for the first movers.
Sequential moves, two thresholds
Next, consider the sequential-move variant with two thresholds (Seq 2). If the first mover contributes c F ≤ 6, the analysis is as above. But in the two-level game, the first mover may also choose her contribution in the range c F ∈ [8, 10] in order to make the second level feasible.
Players with standard preferences will not provide the public good at the second level in the subgame perfect equilibrium. Given if c F = 8, the public good will be provided at level one with 60.7 percent probability and with 39.3 percent probability at level two. Then consider c F = 9. If c S = 18 − c F , we obtain U F (9, 9) = 16, whereas for c S = 12 − c F we get U F (4, 8) = 17 − 6β S . We find that 16 < 17 − 6β S iff 1 − 6β S > 0.
In the α-β dataset, 19.7 percent of the subjects meet this condition. That is, if c F = 9, the public good will be provided at level one (two) with 19.7 (80.3) percent probability. Finally, the case c F = 10 turns out to be identical regarding the second-movers' incentives. That is, c F = 9 and c F = 10 are equally likely to be "exploited" by the second mover, and the predicted frequencies of public good provision are hence the same. Table 4 : Predicted second-mover responses conditional on first-mover choices between 8 and 10
and expected first-mover monetary payoff in Seq 2
Consider next the first movers. c F = 10 will never be chosen in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by first movers because c F = 9 triggers the same second-mover response as c F = 10 (in terms of public good provision) but c F = 9 yields a higher expected payoff and higher F&S utility than c F = 10. As for the choice between c F = 8 or c F = 9, we find that c F = 8 yields a lower expected monetary payoff than c F = 6 (see Table 4 ) and accordingly an even lower F&S utility. Hence, a risk neutral first mover will never choose c F = 8 in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The remaining possibilities are that first movers will either choose c F = 6 or c F = 9. Contributing c F = 6
yields an expected utility of 14 and c F = 9 gives an expected utility of 15.015 − 1.182α. Now 15.015 − 1.182α > 14 iff α < 0.859. This is predicted to hold for 36 percent of the subjects in the α-β dataset.
Proposition 2. For treatment Seq 2, the standard model makes the same predictions as for Taking second-and first-mover predictions together, we finally derive the prediction for the frequencies of public good provision. We expect the public good to be provided at step level 1 with a frequency of 0.64 + 0.36 · 0.197 = 0.711 and at step level 2 in the rest of the cases.
Simultaneous moves, one threshold
With simultaneous moves, there are multiple equilibria both in the standard model and in the F&S model. With standard preferences, both players contributing nothing and all allocations where c 1 +c 2 = 12 are the pure-strategy equilibria. 9 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, all of these equilibria are also Nash equilibria with calibrated F&S preferences except for those where (c 1 = 2, c 2 = 10) and (c 1 = 10, c 2 = 2). (Proof available upon request.)
We believe that it is unlikely that entirely symmetric players will coordinate on asymmetric equilibria and we therefore focus on symmetric equilibria. The two symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria are c i = c j = 0 and c i = c j = 6, and the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium has both players contribute c i = 0 with 40 percent probability and c i = 6 otherwise with standard preferences.
With the calibrated F&S model, the symmetric pure strategy (Bayesian-Nash) equilibria c i = c j = 0 and c i = c j = 6 are the same but the best response correspondence changes both quantitatively and qualitatively. First of all, note that we can "purify" the mixed-strategy equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973) as we have a population of 58 different types of players in the α-β dataset.
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We will analyze the mixed equilibrium such that each of these players chooses a pure strategy.
From Assumption 2, players know the distribution of types and thus they also know how many of the other players will play which strategy in equilibrium. In the (Bayesian-Nash) mixed-strategy equilibrium with calibrated F&S utilities, 36 percent of the players contribute c i = 0 whereas 64 percent choose c i = 6. Hence, more types contributing c i = 6 are required with F&S preferences to make players indifferent in the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
There is, however, also a qualitative difference to the standard case. With standard preferences, all players have the same best reply: if less than 60 percent of the players are expected to contribute, nobody will contribute (and vice versa if more than 60 percent contribute). With the calibrated F&S model, it is not the case that all players have the same best response. If less than 64 percent of players are expected to contribute c i = 6, some players will still contribute. Learning will is slower and the shape of the best response correspondence differs from the standard case. We discuss this in detail below.
Proposition 3. In treatment Sim 1, the symmetric equilibria are c i = c j = 0 and c i = c j = 6. In the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium 60 percent of the players choose c j = 6; and 64 percent in the case of F&S preferences.
9 There are also numerous mixed-strategy equilibria.
10 Among the 61 players reported in Table 2 , three types occur twice so that there are 58 types in total.
Simultaneous moves, two thresholds
We turn to the variant with simultaneous-move game with two thresholds (Sim 2). As argued above for Seq 2, meeting the second threshold is not a Nash equilibrium with standard preferences. As the equilibria derived above for Sim 1 are unaffected by the introduction of the second threshold;
with standard preferences, Sim 2 has the same Nash equilibria as Sim 1.
We now look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of players with F&S utilities where the second level of the public good is provided. Suppose that some types choose c = 9. Above, we have seen that, given c i = 9, 80.3 percent of all types will reply with c j = 9 whereas the rest plays c j = 3. Hence, there cannot be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where all types choose c i = 9. We will therefore look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where p percent of all F&S types choose c i = 9 whereas 1 − p choose c i = 3.
The expected utility from playing c = 9 is pU (9, 9) + (1 − p)U (9, 3) = 16p + (1 − p)(11 − 6α), and the expected utility from playing c = 3 is pU (3, 9)
Contributing 9 yields a higher expected F&S utility than contributing 3 iff
For F&S players with α = β = 0, this condition is never met (as seen above); that is, selfish own utility maximizers will always choose c = 3. If p is sufficiently large, however, inequality averse players prefer c = 9. In the α-β dataset, we find that for p = 0.72 exactly 72 percent of the players (44 players) have pU (9, 9) + (1 − p)U (9, 3) > pU (3, 9) + (1 − p)U (3, 3) whereas for 28 percent (17 players) the inequality is reversed. Thus these strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
It remains to check, though, whether it pays to deviate to any contribution other than 9 or 3. Thus we have established:
Proposition 4. The Bayesian Nash equilibria of Sim 1 are also equilibria in treatment Sim 2.
With standard preferences, there are no additional equilibria. With the calibrated F&S preferences, 72 percent of the F&S types choosing c = 9 and the rest c = 3 is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Hypotheses
Based on Propositions 1 to 4, we will now derive two hypotheses regarding the impact of our two treatment variables. Comparing the predicted public good provision in Sim vs. Seq, we note that there are multiple equilibria in the Sim treatments and that the public good is not provided in all equilibria. By contrast, in the Seq treatments, the equilibrium is unique and the public good is provided (at least at level one) in the unique equilibrium. This holds for both the one and the two-threshold case. We maintain no hypothesis regarding contributions in the Sim vs. Seq treatments.
Hypothesis 1.
The public good will be provided more frequently in the Seq treatments compared to Sim.
Our second hypothesis, though, does depend on assuming F&S preferences. Propositions 1 to 4 show that public good provision can be improved if there is the second threshold. There are multiple equilibria in the Sim treatments anyway but there exists an equilibrium in which the second level is met with positive probability. For both Seq 2 and Sim 2, we note that even if one player attempts to reach the second level but the other player exploits this, this does not harm total payoffs that much as the first level of the public good is still provided. In both the simultaneous-move treatment and the sequential treatment with two levels, players may yield a higher payoff by achieving the second threshold level. Therefore they have an incentive to make higher contributions and public good provision will be more likely in the presence of two thresholds.
If first movers make higher contributions in Seq 2, fewer punishments should occur and we should see more second movers who contribute. Both effects should cause increase public-good provision at least at level one.
Hypothesis 2. The public good will be provided more frequently and contributions will be higher in the treatments with two thresholds compared to one-threshold treatments.
Overview of the Results
We present our results in three parts. In this section, we present a brief overview of the results.
Section 6 presents tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Section 7 presents a more detailed analysis of the predictive power of the calibrated F&S model. Table 5 presents a summary statistics of the averages of our main variables of interest. (Session level data and variability measures can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix.) The second threshold level leads to a higher (sum of) contributions than the one-level variant both in the simultaneous and the sequential treatment. The sequential-move order leads to a higher sum of payoffs compared to the simultaneous treatments. Public good provision at the first level is most effective in the treatments with sequential moves. PG level 1 is provided most frequently (85.56%) Seq 2. Only in 6 percent of the Sim 2 cases is the public good provided at the second threshold level. In Seq 2, however, it does come out better (16.67%) in Seq 2). 11 Defining successful coordination as cases without wasteful contributions, we find that coordination is best in the environments with sequential moves. Table 5 : Summary statistics of our four treatments. Note that the public good is provided at level 2 (χ 2 = 1) only if it is also provided at level 1 (χ 1 = 1).
Main Treatment Effects
We now report tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2. We mainly apply regression analysis where we take possible dependence of observations into account by clustering at the session level. We additionally report, in footnotes, non-parametric tests in which case we count each randomly matched session as one observation.
12 In these cases, we report two-tailed p-values.
11 Note that, in our treatments with two threshold levels, when the second level is met, this also counts as successful provision of PG level 1 by definition. 12 Since we have three sessions per treatment, these tests are either significant at the five percent level or insignificant: when comparing two treatments with three observations per treatment, there are 6 3 = 20 different possibilities to rank the observations. Thus the probability to observe the outcome where the lowest observation
As dependent variables we use sequential (a dummy which is equal to one if the move order is sequential), twolevel (a dummy which is equal to one if there are two levels), the interaction sequenial × twolevel ; furthermore we control for period and the sessionsize. We typically report three regressions. Regression (1) reports the impact of the treatment variables sequential and twolevel only. Regression (2) includes the interaction sequential × twolevel, and (3) adds period and sessionsize. We ran further regressions where we add the interactions of sequenial, twolevel and sequenial × twolevel with period. We briefly report whether these additional regressions (not fully reported here but are available upon request) lead to qualitatively different results in each the of the following four sections.
Sum of contributions
We first analyze the sum of contributions of the (randomly matched) two-player groups. The left panel of Table 6 reports a linear regression suggesting that the sum of contributions is not significantly influenced by the order of moves. Consistent with our Hypothesis 2, adding the second threshold leads to a significantly higher sum of contributions. 13 The interaction of a sequential move order and two levels does not lead to a further increased sum of contributions. Period is not significant, thus the sum of contributions is not affected by time dynamics. This still holds when we additionally employ the interactions of sequential, twolevel and sequential × twolevel with period.
The variable sessionsize is significant, that is, in sessions with more participants contributions are lower. While the coefficient is small, we note that this is consistent with findings in Botelho et al. (2009) . In their paper repeated settings with "random strangers" and "perfect strangers" matching protocols are compared. The authors find that the assumption that subjects treat Random Strangers designs as if they were one-shot experiments is false. Our results indicate that the session size and hence the likelihood of meeting a random stranger again has an impact on contributions.
Sum of payoffs
In the right panel of Table 6 , we report the results of a linear regression on the sum of payoffs of the two players. The table shows that the sequential contribution mechanism significantly improves in one treatment is still higher than the highest observation in another treatment is p = 1/20 = 0.05. All other outcomes are not significant. 13 Hypothesis 2 is also supported in that ranksum tests suggest that both Sim 2 and Seq 2 have significantly higher contributions than Seq 1 (p = 0.05), however, the comparisons to Sim 1 are not significant. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 6 : OLS regressions of sum of contributions and sum of payoffs.
payoffs. 14 The second step level insignificantly reduces the payoffs. This can be explained by the fact that, two thresholds increase contributions but, as we will see, the second level is rarely actually achieved. The size of the sessions is weakly significant, but, again, the coefficient is small.
When we add the interaction sequential × twolevel, we find that it significantly increases subjects' payoff compared to the baseline Sim 1. The difference between Seq 1 and Seq 2 is, however, not significant as follows from a Wald test (p = 0.125). Further, when we add the interactions of sequential, twolevel and sequential × twolevel with period to the regression, sequential × twolevel is insignificant. Instead, period × twolevel and period × sequential are negative and significant.
This suggests an overall negative impact of the second threshold on payoffs.
14 The according ranksum tests indicate that both Seq 1 and Seq 2 have significantly higher payoffs than Sim 1
and that Seq 2 has higher payoffs than Sim 2 (p = 0.05). Other the comparisons are not significant. does not lead to a higher frequency of public good provision. Interacting sequential with two thresholds suggests borderline significant support for an increased public-good provision which, however, disappears once we control for period and sessionsize. Overall, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2 which predicts that the second threshold leads to more public good provision. In regression (3), we find that the coefficient of sessionsize is negative and weakly significant. That is, sessions with a higher numbers of subjects exhibit lower public good provision. We note, however, that the coefficient of sessionsize is small. Adding the interactions with period does not change the results qualitatively, although the treatment variable sequential turns out to be highly significant in this regression. Table 7 also presents a probit regression of the frequency of public good provision of level 2.
Public good provision
(Here, twolevel cannot be part of the regression analysis, of course.) sequential is again significant, that is, sequential-move contributions also stimulate the provision of the second level which is additional support for Hypothesis 1. The dummy sessionsize is not significant. Regression (2) reveals that public good provision at level two moderately decreases over time. Adding the period interactions in an additional regression (not reported here) show that the negative time trend is driven by sequential. In this regression, period is insignificant but period × sequential is.
Coordination rates
We define C = c 1 + c 2 and cases of successful coordination as those where C ∈ {0, 12} and C ∈ {0, 12, 18} in the one-and two-step treatments, respectively. To economize on space, we report descriptive statistics and simple non-parametric tests here only. A regression analysis of successful coordination is qualitatively very similar to the one on payoffs reported above.
15 Ranksum tests consistent with this finding are that both Seq 1 and Seq 2 have significantly higher public good provision than Sim 2 and that Seq 2 has higher payoffs than Sim 1 (p = 0.05 Table 7 : Probit regressions of public-good provision or too high (C > 12). As for the sum of these inefficient cases, we find that, in Sim 1, 51 percent of the subjects do not manage to coordinate. The remaining cases are those where C = 0 where coordination is successful in that no contributions are wasted but no public good is being provided.
In Seq 1, there are only 22 percent cases with coordination failure. Mainly, these involve second movers punishing low first-mover contributions. However, two levels are efficient in the environment with sequential moves which explains the significance of our interaction term sequential × twolevel. The result is driven by first movers contributing higher amounts in Seq 2 compared to first movers in the one-level treatment. This is shown in Table 5 where average first-mover contributions of Seq 1 and Seq 2 are presented.
It shows that first movers on average make higher contributions in the sequential treatment with two thresholds. In Seq 2 first movers contribute on average more than half of the first threshold (6.41). Thus, second movers are not "exploited" that frequently and they only punish first-mover behavior in 10 percent of all cases. This is in contrast to the one-level treatment where first movers make average contributions below six (4.97) and second movers punish in 19 percent of all cases. What improves payoffs in the sequential case?
We saw that both public good provision and coordination are significantly better in the sequential treatments. We also saw that higher payoffs occur in Seq 1 (25.12) compared to Sim 1 (22.42).
Can we say more about the sources of higher payoffs in the sequential case?
In order to investigate this question, we analyze the sum of payoffs conditional on the public good provision. First, conditional on χ 1 = 1, we find that the payoff sums are nearly the same in Seq 1 (27.99, # 316 observations) and Sim 1 (27.53, # 270). They do not differ much from the conditional mean of 27.76| χ1=1 . The explanation is that coordination is rather good in either case, provided χ 1 = 1. In Seq 1, players coordinate successfully in 312 of the 316 cases (99%), so there is almost no waste. In Sim 1, successful coordination occurs in only in 196 of 270 cases (73%).
However, excess contributions conditional on χ 1 = 1 are small: in the 74 cases of unsuccessful coordination, only 1.7 cent are wasted on average. Now we condition on χ 1 = 0, that is, we analyze the data where the public good was not provided. We find that subjects earn substantially more in Seq 1 (16.42, # 104) compared to Sim 1 (13.21, # 150) and also compared to the conditional mean of 14.52| χ1=0 . Successful coordination is rare here in both treatments: 14 out of 104 (13.5%) in Seq 1 and 10 out of 150 cases (6.7%) in Sim 1, respectively. However, provided coordination is not successful, a lot more money is wasted with simultaneous moves: conditional on χ 1 = 0 and unsuccessful coordination, 7.27 cents are wasted in Sim 1 as opposed to 4.13 cents waste in Seq 1.
To sum up: if the public good is provided, payoffs and coordination are similar in Seq 1
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and Sim 1 but the public good is provided more often in Seq 1. The main source of the payoff difference of 2.7 therefore appears to be the wasteful contribution in Sim 1 when the public good is not provided.
The predictive power of the calibrated F&S model
We now discuss the quantitative predictions of the F&S model in more detail. We begin with Proposition 1. Figure 3 contrasts the predictions made in Table 3 In Seq 1, all first movers should choose c F = 6 in order to maximize payoffs (and F&S utilities). This is not the case as c F = 6 is chosen only in 37.1 percent of the cases. In our Seq 1 data, it 16 This is warranted because, firstly, the F&S model does not predict any differences and, secondly, we do not observe differences-with the exception of c F = 5 where contribution rates differ significantly (two-sample chi-square test, χ (1) = 8.579, p < 0.01). Importantly, the minor differences we observe are not systematic. Contributions of c S = 12 − c F are more frequent for c F = {3, 4} in Seq 1 than in Seq 2 but the other way round for c F = {5, 6}.
Note that, for c F = 6, we cannot apply a test because the predicted frequency is 100 percent. Regarding c F = 2, we only have two observations so we cannot test either (in one case the PG was provided). We finally turn to Proposition 3, the Sim 1 case. In Sim 1, we observe that in 81.4 percent of the cases subjects choose c ≥ 6 and in 13.8 of the cases they choose c = 0. 18 Hence, both the standard model and the calibrated F&S model would predict that play converges to the purestrategy equilibrium where both players choose c = 6. This is, however, not the case. There is no positive time trend, and some players persistently choose c = 0. Why do subjects not best respond? Figure 5 illustrates what might be going on. It shows the best-reply correspondences for standard selfish players, for F&S players and also for players with standard preferences but with a degree of risk aversion according to the findings in Holt and Laury (2002) . With selfish and rational players, the best-reply correspondence has a "bang-bang" property.
If the belief is that player j chooses c i = 6 less than 60 percent, all players will best respond with As mentioned in Proposition 3, the share of players choosing c F = 6 required such that c F = 6 is a best reply that is slightly larger with F&S players. Inequality aversion has an effect similar, in fact a stronger effect, than risk aversion (on average, players in Holt and Laury, 2002 , are slightly risk averse). We also see that the best replies differ from the case with standard preferences.
Around the mixed-strategy equilibrium, the best replies are not vertical but somewhat "flat",
18 These percentages are are based on data from periods 6 to 10 where we observe less heterogeneity in the data.
Some subjects indeed choose c i > 6, but-for our data-0 < c j < 6 is never a best reply with standard or F&S preferences. Thus we focus on c ≥ 6 and c = 0.
implying that not all players will best reply once the fixed point of the mixed strategy is exceeded.
This is what we see in the data.
What can we conclude from the analysis of the calibrated F&S model? First, we find remarkable confirmations of the predictions of the model. One may argue that, regarding Seq 1, these are not so surprising because of the partial similarity of Seq 1 to the ultimatum game (from which the alphas were elicited). However, the Seq 1 prediction also depends on the joint distribution and not on the alpha only. Moreover, we also found confirmation of the calibrated F&S model for Seq 2 and Sim 1. Hence, we conclude that the model is particularly powerful in our setup.
How about the two contradictions to the calibrated F&S model then? First, we found that first movers behaved too greedily to be consistent with Assumptions 1 and 2, providing c F < 6 too often. This finding is not new. For standard ultimatum-game experiments, it can be argued that offering the equal split may be payoff maximizing (assuming risk neutrality), but about half the the proposers offer less than the equal split.
19 Huck et al. (2001) show that, in quantity-setting duopoly, Stackelberg followers are inequality averse but the Stackelberg leaders still choose too high an output. The payoff maximizing (and inequality minimizing) output in that dataset was the symmetric Cournot-Nash solution. In ultimatum games, the Stackelberg game and this study, risk-loving behavior can explain the first-mover behavior. However, it could also be that first movers feel entitled to more than 50 percent of the pie whereas second movers regard the equal split as fair. Social norms may be perceived differently by first and second movers.
We secondly saw that second movers exploit first-mover trust (that is, c F = 9) too often in Seq 2. We consider the following explanation plausible. In Seq 2, first movers frequently choose c F < 6 and, just as in Seq 1, the second movers are in the weaker position. Whenever c F = 9, second movers are suddenly in the stronger position. They can now ensure themselves the higher payoff and they often do so. It could be the low degree of trustworthiness is second movers scoring off greedy first movers, with a "now it is my turn" attitude (recall the game is repeated 10 times).
In contrast to costly punishments of c F < 6, responding with c S = 3 to any c F = 9 is free, in fact yields an even higher payoff. If so, second movers do not reflect that first movers contributing c F = 9 are unlikely to be the same first movers who offered c F < 6 in a previous round.
Conclusion
How should, say, two academics organize their joint work when the goal is that a certain threshold in terms of quality of the journal has to be met? Our experiments indicate two answers to this question. First, we find that an additional second step level (say, targeting an A-rather than a B-level journal) does lead to significantly higher contributions (efforts in the case of team work), although the impact on payoffs is ambiguous and insignificant. The effect on public good provision is positive, especially in the sequential case (where the effect is significant). The logic is as follows:
first movers often contribute high 20 such that the second step level can be met. Second movers may exploit this by contributing less, however, they still contribute enough so that the probability of meeting the first step-level increases. For academic team work, say, a strategy like "we need to invest this much effort for a B journal, but with that much more work we could go for an A-level journal" might work out. With simultaneous moves, however, coordination failure becomes more frequent.
Second, we find that the sequential-move variant yields more frequent provision of the public good and higher payoffs. This confirms the literature on leading by example where, in our setup, it is mainly the better coordination that renders the sequential mechanism superior in the threshold public-good game. Even though some low-contributing first movers (who actually give a bad to five). Their treatments with two and three thresholds can be compared to our experiments with simultaneous moves because in these treatments the Nash equilibria are the same (zero and 7.5 in their case) whereas the Pareto optimum is higher with three than with two thresholds. This is the same in our experiment. 21 Comparing two and three thresholds, Chewning et al. (2001) find that contributions increase in the first five periods with three thresholds. However, in periods 11 to 15, they are below the two thresholds case. This is consistent with the findings in our treatment with two levels where two levels initially lead to higher contributions. We also find that contributions decease over time. They are, however, higher than in the one-level treatment throughout.
20 A similar pattern is observed by Laury et al. (1999) who find in a public-good setting with diminishing returns that players contribute more than the Nash prediction. 21 Their treatments with one and two thresholds, by contrast, do not compare easily to our setup because introducing a second threshold changes Nash equilibria (zero and 7.5 rather than zero and 12.5) but maintains the Pareto optimum (at 12.5). Their treatment with five thresholds can neither be compared to our two-threshold treatment.
In this treatment again the Nash equilibrium is 7.5. Moreover, two additional thresholds exist which both guarantee a higher Pareto optimum. By contrast, in our two-threshold setup this is only the case for one additional threshold. 
Instructions for treatment Seq 2 (not intended for publication)
Welcome to our experiment. By taking part in this experiment, you have the possibility to earn money. The amount you earn will depend on your decisions and it will also depend on the decisions of another participant, so please follow these instructions carefully. It is particularly important that you do not talk to any of the other participants until the experiment is over. Furthermore, please switch off your mobile phone. If you have a question, please raise your hand; we will come to your desk and answer it privately.
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The experiment consists of exactly 10 rounds. At the end of the 10 rounds, one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected. Your payoff in cash at the end will be the income you earned in this randomly selected round. There is an even number of participants in this room. At the beginning of each round, we will randomly match you with another participant. This may be a different participant from round to round. Please note that we will not inform you about the participant you are matched with. How you will earn your income is explained below.
The experiment
In the beginning of every round, you will be given an endowment of 10 euros. You will have to decide about how to divide the 10 euros into two possible projects.
One of the two projects is a private project. You are the only person who can contribute to this project. The other project is a joint project between you and the person you are matched with.
Every euro you contribute to the private project will pay you one additional euro at the end of the round. The joint project pays only if the sum of contributions to this project is at least 12 euros. If this target is met, both you and the participant you are matched with will get a bonus payment of 10 euros each at the end of the round. If the sum of contributions was at least of 18 euros, both you and the participant you are matched with will receive a bonus payment of 15 euros. Hence your income in each round is the sum of euros contributed to the private project plus, potentially, the bonus payment of the joint project. Again, at the end of the 10 rounds, we randomly select one of the 10 rounds. Your income in this randomly selected round determines your payment at the end of the experiment.
To make sure that everybody understands how their earnings are determined, we will provide you with examples and additional control questions. Please take note that the contributions in euro in these examples and control questions are entirely arbitrary and for demonstration purposes only. In the actual experiment, the payoffs will depend on the participants' actual decisions. 
Control questions
Before we continue with the experiment instructions, we want to make sure that everybody understands how payoffs can be earned. Please answer the questions below. Please raise your hand if you have a question. After some minutes we will check your answers. After the decisions have been made, both participants will be given an information screen at the end of the round. This information screen will show the participants the individually chosen contributions to the joint project in that round. Both participants get information about their individual returns from their private projects. Furthermore, the amount of the bonus payment will be displayed. Additionally, both participants are informed about their individual total payoff in that round.
Beginning the experiment
Please take a look at your computer screen and make your decision. If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand and we will come to your desk to answer it.
35

